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Abstract 
 
Margaret Ngigi1, Christopher Delgado2, Steven J. Staal1* & Stephen Mbogoh3 
 
Dairy production is a key small farm strategy for generating income in the Nairobi 
milk shed. The high perishability of milk under Kenyan conditions appears to be associated 
with a high frequency of small individual transactions, the terms of which are subject to 
forced “fire” sales, delayed payments or default.  Reliability of outlets in the wet (milk glut) 
season is also a consideration, and credit sales typically are matched with a commitment to be 
a steady customer. Two salient phenomena are observed: reported unit milk prices differ 
widely within the same location and time period, and spot sales for cash tend to be at a higher 
unit price than sales on monthly credit. We hypothesize that dairy farmers in the Nairobi milk 
shed choose market outlets and levels of cash sales that reduce transactions costs and help 
assure reliable future outlets, at the expense of current income. A decomposition of producer 
milk prices across time, space, and market outlet suggests that reliability of outlet is worth up 
to 17 % of the spot price, in addition to waiting a month to be paid.  Risks of credit default are 
illustrated by predicted weekly credit prices that are 5 % lower than monthly credit prices.  
Data from 21 smallholder farms monitored daily over one year are used to estimate a two-
limit Tobit model of the role of the characteristics of market outlets and producers in 
explaining the share of producer output sold for cash rather than credit.  Younger, more 
educated producers, receiving a regular off-farm salary, and near market centres are shown to 
be more likely to accept sales on credit.  Older producers with more experience but less 
formal education are more likely to sell for cash rather than credit.  The power of the model to 
explain different prices for milk in the same location and week suggests that such price 
differences viewed unidimensionally are not evidence of lack of market integration as 
conventionally defined, but an outcome of differential transactions costs and perceptions of 
risk by different producers.   
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The Role of Market Outlet in Determining Terms for Milk Sales by Smallholders 
in Kenya 
Issues and Data 
  
Conceptualisations of buyer-seller relationships in the New Institutional 
Economics, coupled with a growing number of related empirical works in developing 
countries, reflect a rising interest in the strategic roles that contractual arrangements 
can play in conveying non-monetary exchange values that are intrinsically important 
to exchange-partners (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993; Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz, 
1993).   Related to this is the theme that the choice of one contractual form over other 
forms is a considered decision based on utility differentials (Ganesan, 1994; Heide 
and John, 1990).  Equally significant is the notion that relational transactions are 
mainly founded on trust (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet, 1991; Fafchamps, 1996; 
Doney and Cannon, 1997 Garbarino and Johnson, 1999) and safeguarded by 
contracts, which may either be in explicit or implicit forms (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 
1987).   
In this context, trust is conceptualised as the confidence a party in an exchange 
places on the credibility and reliability of his exchange-partner (Morgan and Hunt, 
1994; Moorman, et al 1993).  Further, Ganesan (1994) argues that participation in a 
relational transaction demonstrates “ an expectancy held by an individual that the 
partner’s word or written statement can be relied on”.  This implies that it is possible 
for relational contracts to be potentially useful yet undesirable if a party in an 
exchange has misgivings about the credibility and reliability of the exchange-partner. 
The potential usefulness of the above conceptualisation in revealing the 
qualitative nature of contractual arrangements involving sale of agricultural 
commodities by smallholder farmers is apparent.  This paper applies the concept in 
the examination of two peculiar aspects observed in the sale of milk by smallholder 
dairy farmers in Nairobi milk shed.  First, prices differ widely within the same 
location and time, even though local milk markets otherwise seem to be relatively 
well-integrated (Staal, Delgado, and Nicholson, 1997).  Second, as this paper will 
demonstrate below, spot sales for cash tend to be at a higher unit price than sales 
where the producer only gets paid a month later.  The aim is to describe and to 
evaluate milk sales arrangements against the background of three broad categories of 
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factors hypothesized to be significant determinants of smallholder’s choice of market 
outlet.  These are the commodity attributes of milk; the risk factors inherent in market 
outlets available to the smallholders; and the producer household-specific factors 
predisposing a household to sell in one or the other market outlet.  
The significance of the study is found in the fact that most sub-Saharan 
African countries have since the mid 1980s embarked on reforms aimed at reducing 
the role of the state while increasing that of the private sector and of market forces in 
the co-ordination of food markets.  Former systems of market regulations encouraged 
sale of agricultural commodities through single-channel outlets whose time pattern of 
payment and mode of transmission of payment to farmers were prescribed by the 
government.   Liberalization of markets has stimulated the emergence of diverse 
market outlets with corresponding diversity in time patterns of payments.   However, 
as the system develops, it is expected that the long-run market structure will be 
conditioned by the interacting influences of the contractual aspects of value to 
producers and the risk factors inherent in the different food commodities and in the 
emerging market outlets.  The role of public policy will then be to address issues of 
contract enforcement and to facilitate access to communications and transport services 
within a market context. 
The data used in the study were collected in 1998 in a longitudinal survey 
involving 21 smallholder dairy households in Kiambu district, Kenya.  Daily milk 
production and sales data were collected over a 12 month period, with a recall period 
of 3 to 4 days.  The longitudinal survey was designed to allow appropriate monitoring 
of changes in flow variables and consequent adjustments in households’ milk sale 
activities.  Data collected included detailed measures on milk production, household’s 
characteristics of access to milk market outlets and marketing services, and marketed 
surpluses sales.  Along with these, data was also collected on market outlets, prices 
obtained in each market outlet used, and organisation of milk collection at the farm 
level.  To capture area-specific factors of importance to market accessibility, the 
sample was drawn from six sub-locations.  
 
Smallholder Marketing Constraints and Risks: Implications for contractual forms 
 
Raw milk is a highly perishable (non-stock) commodity with a daily flow 
(once or twice-a-day harvest) of marketable streams that extend for at least a full 
                                                                                                                                                           2    
 
 3
lactation period. The frequency of market transaction therefore tends to be very high 
(Staal, Delgado and Nicholson, 1997).  It is reasonable to presume that there is value 
in contractual forms designed to offer market assurance to producers that streams will 
be maintained, especially when milk is plentiful on the market during the rainy season 
and producers face the risk of not being able to sell a non-storable (for them) 
commodity (Jaffee 1995).  It is therefore expected that the farmer does not search for 
market outlets one transaction at a time.  Rather, the farmer is expected to engage in a 
purposive effort to secure transactions over the horizon of at least one full lactation 
period (about one year).  This suggests that repeat transactions under a contractual 
arrangement are preferable to many farmers when compared to simple spot 
transactions.  
Another feature of particular significance when discussing smallholder milk 
marketing is the typically small quantity of individual daily marketable surplus.  This 
coupled with the characteristically high banking transactions costs (resulting from 
lack of rural banking institutions), and the practice of paying bills and wages at the 
month’s-end, place a great significance on the time-pattern of milk payments.   Lump-
sum payments may be intrinsically valuable where liquidity flow is required in lumps 
to match lumpy expenditures e.g., school fees or farm production expenditures and 
there is little financial intermediation.  Furthermore, receiving daily payments in coins 
for small transactions has obvious disadvantages in any society, especially without 
banks, over a reliable periodic settlement in larger amounts.   It is therefore logical to 
presume that contractual arrangements that combine repeat transactions with the 
ability to accumulate daily payments (so as to hand the farmer a lump sum amount at 
weeks, fortnights’ or months-end) are preferable to the receipt of a daily stream of 
small amounts of money.  
Closely associated with the reliability-of-outlet constraint for smallholders is 
the problem for buyers/market agents of volume unpredictability inherent in procuring 
large amounts of milk from smallholders.  A large buyer must of necessity procure 
from a large number of smallholders.  However, marketable surplus from a 
smallholder farmer is a residual of home consumption and the production of often 
only one or two cows; it therefore varies.  This coupled with the fact that the farmer 
can sell in a number of different market outlets means that the aggregate volumes 
received by the buyer may fluctuate substantially on a daily basis.  Added to this is 
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the fact that production is mainly based on rain-fed pastures and crop residues, with 
little or no concentrate supplements.   
Volume unpredictability suggests that in exchanges between smallholders and 
large-scale buyers, it might be difficult to define operational volume-based contracts.  
Further, the small quantities of individual marketable surpluses imply that the cost of 
drawing up explicit contracts may be high relative to the value of sales.  This coupled 
with the problem of supply fluctuation implies that implicit1 contracts may be more 
appropriate as compared to explicit2.  
 The above theoretical analysis suggests that, to reflect the utility content of a 
sales arrangement from the perspective of the smallholder dairy farmer, it is useful to 
view the problem from three mutually inclusive dimensions: 
• The price level 
• The presence or absence of a pledge for repeat transactions.   
• The time pattern of payments for milk 
Based on these three dimensions, the arrangements obtainable in the sale of milk by 
smallholders logically fall into three categories as illustrated in table 1.   
 
Table 1.  Types of farmer-buyer sales arrangements 
 Time pattern of 
payment 
Pledge for repeat 
exchange 
On credit sale (OCS) Lump sums  Yes 
Cash-sale single transactions 
(CSST)  
On spot No 
Cash-sale-repeat transactions 
(CSRT)  
On spot Yes 
 
On-credit-sale contracts are of the type termed by de Jasay (1989) “half-spot half-
forward contract”.  By agreement daily milk payments are deferred to accumulate 
over a specified unit of contractual period at the end of which the payments are settled 
in a lump sum.  The total length of contractual period may either be definite or open-
ended.  Such contracts have the advantage of promising a guaranteed market outlet to 
the farmer for at least one unit of contractual period.  However they have certain 
inherent risks, which suggest that in order to safeguard himself, the farmer will seek 
                                                          
1 Implicit contracts are a non-written form that are defined to occur where both parties in an exchange are clear about the 
conditions of exchange, but where an explicit contract is not possible or desirable. 
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on-credit-sales only with buyers who have high stakes in the trade.  The risks include 
delayed payments, non-payments, occasional loss of the entire amount of milk to non-
collection of milk by buyer or to undue rejection of milk delivered to the buyer.  
Delayed payments: the buyer may delay payments such that the farmer is paid after 
t+n days instead of the agreed t days.  This in effect forces the farmer into a situation 
where he or she is an involuntary creditor to the buyer.  Furthermore, uncertainty can 
arise if n varies greatly from one contractual time unit to another; the farmer becomes 
uncertain of the payment date as a result of which planning for the sales proceeds is 
disrupted.  
Non-payment:  due to unforeseen circumstances, the buyer may not be able to pay.  
The buyer may also be tempted to default, unless by defaulting he is likely to worsen 
his payoff or to fall into disrepute.  
Non-collection/undue rejection of milk: repeat transactions with large buyers such as 
large milk processors are typically not volume-based.  They only entail specifications 
of the following: the party responsible for the functions of milk collection and 
delivery, minimum specifications of quality, the mode and transmission of payment, 
and the method of notifying farmers of changes in prices.  The difficulties of 
designing volume-based contracts leaves the farmer vulnerable to the risks of losing 
entire marketable surplus to non-collection or, to loss from undue rejection of milk as 
unwholesome3.   The buyer only pays for milk collected or received subject to the 
minimum specification of quality. Thus the farmer bears full loss if the buyer fails to 
collect or if milk is rejected as unwholesome.   
Where risks are relatively high, the farmer may opt for CSST or CSRT.  These two 
contracts are similar in that they both entail the exchange of milk for cash on the spot.  
But while CSST promises no repeat contracts, CSRT has explicitly specified repeat 
transactions.  It should however be noted that cash-sale payment and OCS are not 
mutually exclusive.  The farmer can apportion his or her marketable surplus to the 
two markets such that a proportion θ (where 0≤ θ≤1) is sold in the cash-sale market 
and the remaining 1- θ is sold in the credit market.  
   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 Explicit contracts are a written specification of terms and conditions agreed upon and voluntarily signed by both parties in an 
exchange. It is thus easy to verify and enforce legally. 
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Milk Marketing in The Survey Area 
 
Figure1 depicts the marketing channels operating in the study area.  The figure 
shows the major market outlets available to the smallholder dairy farmers and the 
relative market shams of volume.  It is clear that the set of market outlets available to 
the producer comprise sales to one’s own dairy cooperative (if a member), itinerant 
raw-milk re-sellers, local  resident traders, direct sales to households, sales to stores 
and kiosks, and milk processors4.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Milk Marketing Channels: Kiambu, Kenya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42% 
Dairy farmers’ co-operative  
Private Processors Itinerant traders 
51% 12% 
44% 14% 
37% 
Consumer 
Producer 
Source:  Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Development and 
Marketing. Smallholder Dairy Project (1997). Unpublished 
results from a survey done to characterise smallholder dairy 
farmers in Kiambu district, Kenya. 
 
Dairy farmers’ co-operative societies constituted the principal market outlet for the 
farmers in 1997, accounting for over half of all the milk marketed.  This was followed 
by direct sales comprising of 37% while sales to itinerant traders comprised only 
12%, as depicted in the figure. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 NB the high perishability of milk make verification of quality difficulty 
4 Sales to private processors in fact can and do by-pass coops entirely, although that is not reflected in 
the 1997 document cited.  The chart also lumps together hotels, restaurants, kiosks and households as 
final consumers. 
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Major modes of payment 
 
Table 2 details the proportions of different types of farmer-buyer contractual 
arrangements that obtained in the different market outlets, based on the 1998 survey 
reported in this paper. The table shows that spot (cash-single) and monthly credit 
payments were the most common modes of payments.  It also suggests that the nature 
of sales agreements was closely tailored to risk structures of the outlets.  For example, 
compared to the other buyer types, contractual arrangements with itinerant raw-milk 
resellers were heavily biased towards cash-single exchanges.   
 
Table 2: Nature of Sales Agreements and Modes of Payments 
Buyer type 
 
N* Cash On credit sales 
  Single Repeat In-
kind 
Week-
ly 
Fort-
nightly 
Monthly 
Co-operative/ 
processor 
3927   0   0  0   0  0 100 
Itinerant traders 1017 73.2 18  0   4.5  0     4.3 
Local-market-
based traders 
  800   3.1   8.5  0   1.5 86.6     0.5 
Household 
consumers 
2033 27.1 11.7    .52   2.8  4.5   53.6 
General retail 
shops/kiosks 
  590  0 11.8 88.2   0  0     0 
Note: N is the number of transactions observations under the respective 
buyer type   
Source: survey results 
 
This can be attributed to characteristics of itinerant trade that are important risk 
factors for producers.  Major among these is the ease of entry and exit from itinerant 
sale of milk.  Compared with milk processing, resale of raw milk does not require 
large capital investments.  A raw-milk trader only requires milk-handling cans and a 
reasonably functioning public transport service or private transport (e.g. a bicycle).  
Furthermore, itinerant traders may not be resident in the milk producing areas but may 
live in the nearest major town, in this case the city of Nairobi, in which case they 
commute to production areas to procure milk.  Thus, unlike local-market-based 
traders, who on account of living among the smallholders and being well-known 
among the local community have a lot invested in social capital, itinerant traders may 
have little to lose in terms of reputation.  All this coupled with the mobile nature of 
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the trade implies that itinerant traders have a relatively higher chance of defaulting if 
milk is sold to them by on-credit-sale.   
 One issue in trade with traders generally, and itinerant traders in particular,  is 
that they tend not to buy on Sundays and holidays, even though cows produce on 
those days as well and cold storage on farm is not available.   
Contractual arrangements with processors, dairy farmers’ co-operative 
societies, and household consumers mostly involved on-credit-sales, and the unit of 
contractual period was typically a month.  The contract period for local-market-based 
traders, however, was typically a fortnight.  This may be a reflection of relative 
degree of trust placed on the different market outlets.    
Arrangements for direct sale to household consumers offered the widest range 
of contractual arrangements. This can partly be explained by the relative ease of 
negotiating customized contracts with neighbouring households and partly by 
geographical segmentation of household consumers.  The household consumer market 
is likely to be geographically segmented, with sales to neighbouring households being 
more oriented to credit sales, while sale to households in further away market centres 
may be more oriented to cash-sale contracts. 
Finally, smallholder options for selling to large buyers are likely to be limited 
to implicit contracts on credit.  Large buyers face adulteration risks in pooling milk 
daily from many small sellers, in addition to market risks of throughput shortfall,  and 
therefore confine themselves to regular trusted sources (Staal, Delgado and 
Nicholson, 1997). This lenders itself to periodic payment for cost minimization 
reasons.  In addition, dairy cooperatives, another large outlet, have traditionally paid 
only on a monthly basis.  
 
Observed producer prices 
 
Average producer prices observed during the 1998 survey are presented in 
Table 3.   Since the data are not evenly grouped and are observed over time and across 
households with different locations and characteristics, their use for analytical 
purposes is limited.  They do suggest the peculiar result, however, that mean credit-
sale prices for milk are in several cases lower that spot market cash prices.  The next 
section will seek to establish this point more rigorously by controlling for other 
possible explanations in an analysis of covariance regression framework. 
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Table 3.  Mean producer price buyer type and mode of payment., 
Kiambu (Ksh/litre) 
 Mode of payment 
 
Cash-
sale Credit 
In-
kind 
Market outlet  Weekly  
Fortnightl
y Monthly  
Co-operative -- -- -- 16.60 -- 
Itinerant trade 19.10 18.00 -- 18.80 -- 
Local bars/ 
hotel/restaurant 18.40 19.40 18.40 19.60 -- 
Household Consumers 23.00 19.70 16.10 20.02 -- 
Processor -- -- -- 16.00 -- 
General retail 
shops/kiosks 24.00 22.60 -- -- 23.74 
 
Decomposition of producer prices 
 
To investigate the role of different effects and interactions in producer price 
formation, we decomposed producer prices by regressing them against fixed effects 
for sales to different sorts of market outlets, weeks, and locations, and on interactions 
between market outlets and payment modes.  The volume of each transaction varied, 
but not outside a magnitude where this was thought to unduly influence unit prices 
within the type of outlet considered.   
Prices were in Ksh./litre for transactions ranging from 0.94  to 18 litres/day  
over the entire data set.  However, sales to coops and processors all tended to be in the 
upper end of the range, sales to traders were tended to be in the intermediate range, 
and sales to households tended to be at the lower end of the range.  In practice, the 
separate influences of size of transaction and purchaser type were hard to separate 
statistically, and an insignificant coefficient for a continuous size variable in the 
producer price model was obtained in the initial run.  The size variable was dropped, 
facilitating but nuancing interpretation of results.  The coefficients below can be 
understood directly in Ksh./litre and are additive, but the difference in prices obtained 
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from  different categories of outlet (coop, trader, household) may also include a small 
fixed effect for differences in size of transaction.   
 
Pijkt   =   P… . +  Outlet i  +  Location k  +  Week t  +  Outlet*Paymentmode ij +  e ijkt 
 
The dependent variable Pijkt is the unit price observed at market outlet i for 
payment mode j at location k and time t.  The constant P…. is the mean market price, 
collapsed over all four dimensions.  The other variables are all fixed effects for the 
elements identified (1-0 dummy variables). 
Results of the price decomposition model are presented in table 4.  As 
hypothesized, inspection of coefficients and error terms reveals that that prices 
differed significantly across the market outlets.  On average, predicted cash prices 
were highest for direct sales to consumers, with itinerant traders paying the next 
highest average price, followed by local-market-based traders.  For monthly credit 
sales, the highest predicted price was for direct sales to households, then to local and 
itinerant traders (few local traders used monthly payment).  The lowest predicted 
prices were for credit sales to processors and dairy coops, which were not 
significantly different from each other. 
 
Notes:  N = 8722 and Adj. R2  = 0.80 
  
Table 4:  Decomposition of Producer Prices for Milk, Kiambu, Kenya 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. T P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Size of transaction (KG) -0.004 0.004 -1.203 0.229 -0.012 0.003 
Unit of measure       
Litre -0.645 0.048 -13.354 0.000 -0.740 -0.551 
Bottle (750 ml) 1.554 0.084 18.436 0.000 1.389 1.719 
Large cup (500ml) 3.286 0.171 19.198 0.000 2.951 3.622 
Small cup (350ml) 0.205 0.113 1.823 0.068 -0.015 0.426 
Buyer-types       
Itinerant trader 2.591 0.051 50.595 0.000 2.491 2.691 
Local-market-based trader 0.152 0.106 1.439 0.150 -0.055 0.359 
Household Consumer 1.333 0.068 19.546 0.000 1.199 1.466 
Processor -0.266 0.072 -3.712 0.000 -0.407 -0.126 
General shop/kiosk 0.557 0.117 4.741 0.000 0.326 0.787 
Buyer-type*mode of payment       
Itinerant trader*weekly -1.682 0.200 -8.431 0.000 -2.073 -1.291 
Itinerant trader*monthly 0.186 0.104 1.785 0.074 -0.018 0.391 
Itinerant trader*in-kind -2.416 0.432 -5.586 0.000 -3.263 -1.568 
Local-market-based trader*in-
kind 0.631 0.169 3.745 0.000 0.301 0.962 
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Local-market-based 
trader*weekly 2.235 0.325 6.879 0.000 1.598 2.872 
Local-market-based 
trader*monthly 1.796 0.578 3.106 0.002 0.663 2.930 
Household Consumer*cash 0.959 0.078 12.230 0.000 0.805 1.112 
Household Consumer*weekly -0.005 0.095 -0.052 0.959 -0.192 0.182 
Household 
Consumer*fortnightly -0.956 0.154 -6.220 0.000 -1.257 -0.655 
Household Consumer*in-kind -1.601 0.393 -4.077 0.000 -2.371 -0.831 
General shop/kiosk*cash 0.597 0.159 3.762 0.000 0.286 0.908 
General shop/kiosk*weekly -0.711 0.287 -2.482 0.013 -1.273 -0.150 
Sub-locations       
Gitaru 6.189 0.104 59.380 0.000 5.985 6.393 
Kanjai 0.060 0.058 1.040 0.298 -0.053 0.173 
Kimathi 1.767 0.110 16.104 0.000 1.552 1.982 
Ngecha 1.132 0.074 15.214 0.000 0.986 1.278 
Karuri 0.904 0.064 14.124 0.000 0.778 1.029 
H -0.047 0.034 -1.409 0.159 -0.113 0.018 
 
Fixed effects for weeks and locations were also included (not shown) 
   Significantly, weekly contract prices predicted for household consumers were 
significantly lower than those for monthly credit sales to households, although both 
were lower than spot price paid by direct consumers.  This reflects the fact that 
reliable, local consumers typically took regular, daily, deliveries from the same 
producer and paid up weekly, which reduced payment transaction costs while also 
being of limited risk to the producer.   Predicted cash prices for locally-based traders 
were not statistically significantly different from fortnightly cash payments by locally-
based traders, which suggests that this was a low risk outlet for sales, and that the 
producer discount rate for credit payments was approximately equal to the value of 
the reduced transactions costs in getting paid once a fortnight, the two balancing each 
other. 
Determinants of  the household share of marketed milk sold on the spot market  
 
The second objective entails an assessment of factors influencing the 
allocation by producers of their household milk sales between spot cash and on-credit 
markets.  To investigate this, the following assumptions are modelled.  On a typical 
day, the farmer has q litres of marketable milk surplus.  Available to the farmer are 
two different contractual arrangements differentiated according to the flow of 
payment; the farmer can sell milk on markets that offer lump-sum payments coming 
regularly after a predetermined period of delivery of milk on credit or he/she can sell 
in markets that exchange milk for cash on the spot.  The farmer can sell the entire 
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marketable surplus (sold daily) to one or the other market, or apportion it between 
them such that a proportion θ (where 0≤ θ ≤1) is sold in the cash-sale market and the 
remaining 1- θ is sold in the credit market.  The proportion θ serves as a good proxy 
for measuring the degree of participation in the cash-sale market and, conversely,  the 
proportion 1-θ serves as a proxy for measuring participation in the sale-on-credit 
credit markets.  
  
Model 
We define a variable Y that takes on a value of one if the parameter θ is 
greater than zero (i.e., some proportion of q is sold in the cash-sale market) and a 
value of zero if q is exclusively sold to the credit market).  The proportion, θ, which 
the farmer can sell through the cash-sale markets, ranges from 0 to 1.  Hence, market 
apportionment (Y) is doubly censored at 0 (all milk is sold to the credit market) and at 
1 (all milk is sold to the cash sale market).   Under this structure, the payment mode 
comprises a decision of not only whether to sell to the cash-sale or to the credit 
markets, but also of the share of marketable surplus to sell to each.  The determinants 
of producer’s choice between the spot and credit sale markets are modelled with a 
two-limit Tobit specification given by:  
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+≤
<+<+
+≥
=
itit
ititit
itit
it
e
ee
e
Y
βX
β XβX
βX
1 if               1
1 0 if   
0 if               0
 
The dependent variable  is the proportion of the total milk that is sold to the cash-
sale markets by household i on day t.  Vector  comprises the explanatory variables 
of which marketable surplus, measured as the absolute volume of milk sold by 
household i on day t, and household-specific socio-economic characteristics affecting 
marketing comprised the primary explanatory variables of interest.  Vector 
comprises of unknown parameters while  is a residual error assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean zero and a constant variance.    
itY
itX
iteβ
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Specific hypotheses 
• The relationship between the proportion (θ) of marketed surplus sold through 
cash-sale market and the amount of marketed surplus (q) is expected to be 
negative.  This follows from the perishability and the daily production flow of 
milk, which implies that the larger the amounts of marketable surplus, the less 
attractive markets that do not promise a guaranteed market for marketable 
streams of milk and the greater the investments in market outlets that offer 
such guarantees. 
• The relationship between θ and age is expected to be positive.  Younger 
farmers are more likely to be open to new forms of exchange and more 
aggressive in seeking new markets and taking risks.  They are also likely to in 
a stage where they are making investments on their farms and are therefore 
may also prefer a lump-sum liquidity flow in the absence of a local banking 
system.  Older farmers may also still be influenced by the expectations created 
by the regulated formal markets of the 70s and 80s, which might overvalue in 
market terms the positive elements of selling through dairy farmers’ co-
operatives.  
• Similarly, higher educational levels are expected to increase willingness to 
engage in credit-based contracts, ceteris paribus.           
• As distance from market centre increases, smallholders are expected to use 
cash-sale markets more, since the enforcement of credit based sales becomes 
more problematic. 
 Choice of payment mode, once an outlet is chosen, is expected to vary with the 
structure and size of family size.  Producer households with school-age children 
are more likely to prefer lump-sum liquidity flow to facilitate payment of school-
fees and similar payments.  On the other hand milk consumption in producer 
households with younger children and infants is more likely to be sold in the 
higher return cash market.  Since the penalty for not being able to sell milk is to 
consume it one’s self, such households may be relatively less concerned about the 
risk of not having a market outlet available in the glut season.   
 
Specification and estimation 
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Table 5 presents the variables used and summary statistics.  As discussed 
earlier, there are three groups of factors, viz., outlet-specific factors, area-specific 
factors and producer household-specific factors that are presumed to be antecedent 
variables for payment mode choice.  On a particular day, t, however, outlet-specific 
factors (e.g., market outlet(s), price(s), time spent on milk sale/delivery and the 
distance to selling point) are determined within the payment mode choice decision 
and are thus endogenous to the choice.  Outlet-specific factors thus vary with 
variations in the parameter θ; they therefore do not enter the right-hand side of the 
model specified above.  Area-specific factors, on the other hand, are exogenous to the 
choice but are constant across smallholder dairy farmers living in a given area and 
across market-outlets available in the area.  Area-specific factors are thus 
appropriately captured in the model through a set of binary categorical control 
variables coded 0/1 to identify households with their area locality.  Household-
specific factors vary across household but pre-exists observations on the response 
variable θ; they thus comprised the major group of predictor variables.   To control for 
seasonal factors, a set of binary categorical variables identifying observation on 
marketed surplus with the week in which they were observed were used.  
 
    
Table 5.  Variable and summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Proportion of total marketed milk that is sold in cash-
sale market 
  0.23   0.40 0 1 
Marketed surplus in litres   7.45   4.76 0.94 18.06 
Age of head of household in years 55.99 11.27 34 75 
Distance to market centre  in kilometres   2.01   1.53 0.1 7 
Years of experience in dairying in number of years 22.88 11.90 4 40 
Number of years of school completed   7.40   4.40 0 13 
Number of children aged below 9years   0.95   0.89 0 2.64 
Number of children aged below between 9 and 
15years 
0.70   1.01 0 3 
Number of children aged below between 9 and 
22years 
1.75   1.38 0 4.34 
Number of household members aged above 22years 3.18   1.11 2 5 
Flow of off-farm income (1 if regular 0 otherwise)     
Holiday (1 if day t falls on a Sunday or a public 
holiday, 0 otherwise) 
0.14   0.35   
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 Results and discussion 
 
 Parameter estimates for the model are shown in table 6.   The overall model 
fit was good (Wald chi2=1996.12 prob>chi2=0.000).  The likelihood ratio test 
indicates that panel-level variance component was significantly different form zero 
(chi2=1773.81 prob>chi2>0.000).  Overall, the model shows reasonable support for 
the hypothesis regarding payment mode choice and the allocation of milk between 
cash-sale and on-credit markets were supported by the data. As expected, the size of 
marketable surplus (β=-0.076 p=0.000), years of school completed (β=0.19 p=0.000), 
and the number of children aged between 9 and 14 years (β=-0.63 p=0.000) had 
significant negative effects on the proportion of milk sold in the cash-sale markets.  
Also as expected, age of the head of household (β=0.017 p=0.000), distance to the 
nearest market center (β=0.44 p=0.000), and the number of children below 9 years of 
age had a significant positive effect on the proportion of milk sold in the cash-sale 
markets.  However, holiday (Sundays and public holidays) (β=-0.01 p=0.604) were 
not significantly related to payment mode choice.  
Estimates suggest that the role of physical market accessibility, as measured 
by the distance to the nearest market centre, is very important in deciding the kind of 
market outlet and hence the mode of payment available to smallholder dairy farmers; 
a unit increase in the distance from nearest market centre increases the proportion of 
milk sold to cash-sale markets by 9.1% and the probability of selling in this market by 
30.3%. This can be explained by the fact that further away a household is from a 
major market centre, the more inaccessible it is for the local-market-based trader.  
Moreover, the centres designated as milk collection centres by Dairy Farmers’ Co-
operative Societies are mostly located at market centres or along main roads.   Thus 
farmers located far away from market centre and main roads are likely to depend on 
itinerant raw-milk traders calling at the farm-gate to sell their marketed surplus. 
 
 
Table 6. Tobit Model of Participation in Cash-sale Market 
  Variable        Coef. Std. Err. 
δE
(Y)/δ(X)
 Probability 
Uncensored 5
                                                          
5 conditional on being uncensored 
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Marketed surplus -0.076 0.006 -0.016 -0.052
Age of head of household 0.017 0.003 0.003 0.012
Distance to market centre 0.444 0.254 0.091 0.303
Years of experience in dairying 0.022 0.004 0.004 0.015
Education -0.027 0.014 -0.005 -0.018
Children aged below 9 years 0.151 0.025 0.031 0.103
Children aged >9yrs ≤14years -0.626 0.043 -0.129 -0.427
Children aged >14years ≤22  0.143 0.016 0.029 0.097
Household members > 22years  0.085 0.013 0.018 0.0580
Regular salary -1.338 0.089 -0.275 -0.912
Holidays -0.013* 0.024 -0.003 -0.009
Constant -2.731 0.256 -0.561 -1.862
sigma_u 0.629 0.030  
sigma_e 0.374 0.009
Rho 0.739 0.017
Notes:  N = 6492  
Wald chi2 (71) 1996.12  prob>chi2=0.000, 
Likelihood ratio test of sigma_u=0: Likelihood ratio test of sigma_u=0: chi2(1)    
=1773.81 prob > chi2=0.000 
Fixed effects for weeks and locations were also included (not shown) 
not significant at 5% 
 
   Structure and size of producer family also played an important role.  A unit 
increase in the number of children aged below 9 years of age increases the proportion 
of sales in the cash-sale markets by 3.1% and the probability by 10.3%.  On the other 
hand, a unit increase in the number of children aged between 9 and 14 year decreases 
the proportion by 12.9% and the probability by 42.7%.   The flow of off-farm income 
and the fixed area-specific factors are also important.  Households receiving regular 
off-farm incomes are less likely to sell in cash-sale market. 
Conclusions 
 
The major objective of the study was to describe the contractual arrangements 
employed by smallholder dairy farmers and to test empirically the relationship 
between choice of payment mode (cash versus credit) and various factors presumed to 
contribute significantly to market outlet risks and transaction costs in the sale of milk 
by smallholder dairy farmers.   The results show that farmers have multiple outlets, 
and suggest strongly that the decision to sell on credit is linked to the risk structure of 
the market outlets, both in terms of reliability throughout the year and the likelihood 
of being paid at the end of the contract. 
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The statistical decomposition of producer prices shows that the predicted average 
price received traders as a market outlet, once other factors have been controlled for, 
is about the same for cash or credit.  However, it differs greatly for direct sales to 
households.  Direct consumers that producers are willing to sell to on weekly credit 
pay nearly 7 % less per unit than cash customers, but monthly credit customers pay 
only 2 % less than cash customers.  Since producers are rarely traders, going door to 
door, it is likely that the only direct household sales that they actively seek are on a 
regular basis.   
Good credit risks and steady customers are supplied for less, and settle 
weekly.  Bad credit risks or only occasional customers need to pay cash, and higher 
per unit prices.  Large purchasers, such as coops and processors, pay the lowest per 
unit prices (about 17 percent below prices paid by household consumers).  This is due 
to the fact that they can consistently buy the whole daily household product and 
purchase in glut times as well as during the dry season.  If all these dimensions of 
price are collapsed to the price of milk per week and location, it is not surprising that 
there is quite a bit of apparent lack of market integration.   The conclusion is not the 
markets per se are not integrated, but that producing households face different 
transactions costs and may have differential perceptions of risks. 
Household-specific transactions costs result from asymmetries in access to 
information and assets, and frequently are proxied by observable household 
characteristics such as demographics, education, income streams and assets that are 
exogenous to the decision being modelled.   We find that with regard to the 
household-level decision to sell to higher-priced spot markets or lower priced credit 
markets, these household characteristic proxy variables work well.  Younger, more 
educated producers are shown to be more likely to accept sales on credit; they are 
more aggressive and apparently more tolerant of risks.  All producers are more likely 
to sell to persons that have a regular monthly salary income and are located close by.  
Older producers with more experience but less formal education are more likely to 
sell for cash rather than credit, ceteris paribus. 
Direct policy conclusions from this phase of the work are hard to assess, since 
the cost of interventions to alleviate the transaction costs affecting smaller producers 
in particular are hard to assess.  However, some broad line of relevant further inquiry 
are apparent.  The lack of viable rural banks in the area surveyed leads to purchasers 
of smallholder products serving as both outlet and bank for the smallholder producers, 
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a situation that cannot be in the producer’s interest.  The lack of formal contract 
enforcement also surely discourages profitable contracts over longer distances.  The 
roughly 17 percent lower producer prices paid on the market by cooperatives and 
processors, with monthly payments only, suggest that producers greatly value the 
convenience and reliability of having one large repeat customer.   
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